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ABSTRACT  
One of the philosophical discussions stimulated by the recent scientific study of psychopathy 
concerns the mental illness status of this construct. This paper contributes to this debate by 
recommending a way of approaching the problem at issue. By relying on and integrating the 
seminal work of the philosopher of psychiatry Bill Fulford, I argue that a mental illness is a 
harmful unified construct that involves failures of ordinary doing. Central to the present 
proposal is the idea that the notion of failure of ordinary doing, besides the first personal 
experience of the patient, has to be spelled out also by referring to a normative account of 
idealised conditions of agency. This account would have to state in particular the conditions 
which are required for moral responsibility. I maintain that psychopathy is a unified enough 
construct that involves some harms. The question whether the condition involves also a failure 
of ordinary doing, as this notion is understood in this paper, is not investigated here. 
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1. Introduction 
People classified as being psychopaths are characterised by a callous, manipulative 
and remorseless behaviour and personality.1 In recent years, scientific research on 
psychopathic offenders, but also on the so called successful psychopaths who do 
not necessarily offend, has increased considerably. Robert Hare’s Psychopathic 
Checklist Revisited (PCL-R) is a diagnostic tool that has played an important 
unifying role in this research.2 There is a growing literature concerning 
psychopaths’ functional, emotional and cognitive peculiarities, and their neural 
and genetic correlates or causes.3  
                                           
1 In the remainder of the text, I use the term “psychopaths” to refer to persons classified as 
having psychopathy. However, this use is not meant to convey a possibly stigmatizing 
identification of these subjects with their condition. 
2 Hare 1991 and Hare 2003. 
3 For surveys, see Blair, Mitchell, and Blair 2005, Kiehl and Sinnott-Armstrong 2013 and Patrick 
2006b. 
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Scientific research on psychopathy has stimulated and informed philosophical 
debates on the appropriate social response to the crimes of psychopaths. Amongst 
other issues, philosophers have also begun to investigate the problem whether, in 
general, psychopathy can be regarded as a mental illness.4 This investigation 
touches upon fundamental conceptual aspects of psychiatry that are at the focus 
of the so called “new philosophy of psychiatry”.5 
This paper, although does not answer the question whether psychopathy is a 
mental illness, recommends an approach to it. At the core of this recommendation 
is the view that a mental illness is a unified construct that involves failures of 
ordinary doing that is harmful to the patient. The notion of failure of ordinary 
doing in this account of the concept of mental illness is inspired by the one 
advanced in the seminal work of the philosopher of psychiatry Bill Fulford.6 The 
primary focus of Fulford’s account is the first-personal phenomenology that is 
constitutive of the negative evaluations that confer illness status to a certain 
condition. This is the phenomenology faced by an agent who is not able to act in 
the ordinary expected ways, cannot recognise ordinary causes and reasons of this 
inability, and does not know how to overcome it. I argue that the notion of failure 
of ordinary action should also be spelled out in a third-personal way, by means of 
idealisations of preferable forms of ordinary agency. Specifically, when considering 
the illness status of psychopathy, also standards concerning moral accountability 
should inform these idealisations. 
In the next section, first I present the construct of psychopathy as diagnosed 
by the PCL-R, and survey the major findings about the functional characteristics 
of psychopaths and the hypothesised underlying neurological correlates. Then, I 
argue that, under a quite liberal notion of unity, psychopathy can be regarded as a 
unified construct. In the third section, I maintain that psychopaths are also in 
some ways harmed by their condition. In addition, I criticise attempts at 
investigating the illness status of psychopathy by using notions of biological 
dysfunction.  In the fourth section, firstly I describe the fundamental tenets of Bill 
Fulford’s account of mental illness. Then, I suggest the specific formulation of the 
notion of failure of ordinary doing to be employed in investigating whether 
psychopathy is a mental illness.   
 
 
                                           
4 See Nadelhoffer and Sinnott-Armstrong 2013 and Malatesti and McMillan 2014. The other issue 
is whether psychopaths are morally and legally responsible for their crimes, see on this Malatesti 
and McMillan 2010 and Kiehl and Sinnott-Armstrong 2013. 
5 Fulford, Thorthon, and Graham 2006, is an extensive introduction to the discipline. 
6 Fulford 1989. 
Psychopathy and failures of ordinary doing 
 
 1140 
2. Psychopathy: the unity of the construct 
 
During the last 70 years experts have advanced and intensely debated different 
formulations of the construct of psychopathy.7 However, Hervey Cleckley 
(Cleckley 1941) has offered a seminal contribution to the contemporary 
articulation of this notion.8 On the basis of his clinical work with several 
individuals, Cleckley individuated the following 16 traits as characteristic of the 
psychopathic personality:  
1. Superficial charm and good “intelligence”. 
2. Absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. 
3. Absence of “nervousness” or psychoneurotic manifestations. 
4. Unreliability. 
5. Untruthfulness and insincerity. 
6. Lack of remorse or shame. 
7. Inadequately motivated antisocial behaviour. 
8. Poor judgment and failure to learn by experience. 
9. Pathologic egocentricity and incapacity for love. 
10. General poverty in major affective reactions. 
11. Specific loss of insight. 
12. Unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations. 
13. Fantastic and uninviting behaviour with drink and sometimes without. 
14. Suicide rarely carried out. 
15. Sex life impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated. 
16. Failure to follow any life plan. 
Cleckley’s characterisation of the psychopathic personality has been the basis 
of later interpretations of this construct. Specifically, Robert Hare has 
characterised the concept of psychopathy by revising some of the personality traits 
delineated by Cleckley and incorporating violent and antisocial behaviour amongst 
the items.9 Hare and collaborators have thus elaborated the Psychopathy 
Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), and some variations of it, as a diagnostic tool that 
aims at establishing how a subject scores on different dimensions of behaviour and 
personality.10  
The PCL-R is used by trained clinicians to evaluate by means of semi-
structured interviews and intensive study of the history of the subject, supported 
by available file records, on 20 items:  
1. Glib/superficial charm.  
2. Grandiose sense of self-worth.  
                                           
7 For historical accounts, see Andrade 2008 and Millon, Simonsen, and Birket-Smith 1998. 
8 For instance, see Patrick 2006a. 
9 Hare 1991, Hare 2003, Hare and Neumann 2010. 
10 For a survey of alterative diagnostic tools to the PCL-R, see Fowler and Lilienfeld 2013. 
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3. Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom.  
4. Pathological lying.  
5. Conning/manipulativeness.  
6. Lack of remorse or guilt.  
7. Shallow affect.  
8. Callous/lack of empathy.  
9. Parasitic lifestyle.  
10. Poor behavioural controls.  
11. Promiscuous sexual behaviour.  
12. Early behavioural problems.  
13. Lack of realistic long-terms goals.  
14. Impulsivity.  
15. Irresponsibility.  
16. Failure to accept responsibility for one’s own actions.  
17. Many short-term marital relationships,  
18. Juvenile delinquency  
19. Revocation of conditional release,  
20. Criminal versatility.  
For each element in the list, there is a score ranging from 0 to 2 points; the 
maximum total score is thus 40 points. When a subject scores 30 or more points 
he/she is considered psychopathic. This cut-off value is usually adopted in North 
America; in Europe, a value of 25 is often used.  
Answering the question whether psychopathy as individuated by the PCL-R is 
a mental illness requires addressing two interrelated general issues. The first one is 
whether the diagnosis of psychopathy is unified enough to individuate more than a 
mere arbitrary list of certain behaviours, inferred mental states, and personality 
traits. The second issue is whether these characteristics and processes, if unified in 
the appropriate way, involve symptoms of an illness, as opposed to certain type of 
behaviours, ways of thinking, feeling and personality traits, which, although 
different or deviant given certain non-medical standards, cannot be regarded as 
pathological. Let us consider the first problem. 
Establishing in general whether a psychiatry diagnostic tool individuates a 
unified construct requires engaging with difficult issues. It has to be established 
which features of that instrument and the associated classification should be taken 
into consideration and when they offer evidence for the desired notion of unity. 
These issues are debated within psychiatry; but they also involve conceptual 
problems that have been the focus of intense philosophical investigation.11  
One of the least problematic aspects of the unitary nature of a certain 
psychiatric kind is the reliability of the diagnostic tool used to diagnose it. This 
reliability depends on the amount of agreement amongst its users. The inter-rater 
                                           
11 See, for instance, chapters 13-14 of Fulford, Thorthon, and Graham 2006. 
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reliability is given by the amount of agreement that different users reach in 
applying the classification to a certain individual. The test-retest reliability is 
specified by the consistency in the use of a classification by the same observer of 
the same case in a period of time. At least in research settings, different trained 
users of PCL-R would agree in the assignment of scores and thus in their diagnosis 
of psychopathy.12 Of course, from these results it does not follow that PCL-R is 
used reliably or should be used in other and more sensitive contexts. For example, 
there is evidence that in civil commitments proceedings different evaluators assign 
significantly different PCL-R scores to the same individuals.13 In any case, even 
complete diagnostic reliability across contexts could not confer alone unity to what 
is so classified.  
Besides commanding agreement amongst the evaluators, a psychiatric 
classification has to be valid. Generally and clearly enough, a valid psychiatric 
classification should characterise features that are shared by several individuals or 
similarities between them that are theoretically important. These similarities 
should at least enable unitary explanations and predictions of relevant behaviours 
and mental states and, eventually, efficacious treatment.14 Spelling out in detail 
this basic characterisation of validity involves addressing other interrelated 
problems.  
First of all, given that psychiatry deals also with “mental” processes, there can 
be diverging views about the kind of basic properties or similarities that should 
ground the desired unification and thus the validity of the psychiatric kind. 
Depending on general views on the nature of the mind, the unifying features or 
similarities would have to be found in the spectrum that goes from the mental level 
to the physical one. Moreover, there is the issue of how characterising the extreme 
and the intermediate points of that spectrum. Some think that mental states and 
processes should be specified behaviourally, other that they should be individuated 
functionally by means of characteristic causal roles, other by means of refinements 
of folk-psychological accounts or by specific psychological theories.15 Similarly, 
also the individuation of the relevant neural properties of the brain can be open to 
different requirements concerning the appropriate type of modelling and its level 
of abstraction.16  
This paper cannot address all the previous difficult issues that fall under the 
mind-body problem rubric. Instead, I set out some “liberal” requirements for the 
underlying unity of a psychiatric construct that appear to have a role in the 
current psychiatric practice. The first requirement is that the unifying features or 
similarities between members of a psychiatric kind can be individuated at different 
                                           
12 See Hare and Neumann 2006, 66-67. 
13 See Boccaccini, Rufino, and Turner 2012. 
14 See Cooper 2007, chapter 4. 
15 For a survey of these theoretical options in philosophy of psychology, see Bermúdez 2005. 
16 See for instance, Churchland and Senjowski 1992, Chapter 2. 
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levels, without providing an ultimate account of the relations between these levels 
and  establish which one them is the most fundamental and most relevant for 
prediction and explanation.  
Although the PCL-R has been used as a unifying diagnostic tool in scientific 
research, some worries about the unity of the construct of psychopathy as 
measured by the PLC-R stem from the inclusion of criminal and antisocial 
behaviour amongst the criteria. One of the traditional criticisms to the antecedents 
of the current notion of psychopathy was that these constructs involved a circular 
inference from criminal and antisocial behaviour to a supposed criminal 
personality and then would involve explaining the same behaviours on the basis of 
that personality.17 In addition, it has being argued that PCL-R is defective because 
a clinical assessment should identify personality traits that lead to particular 
behaviours as opposed to the assessment of behavioural symptoms to determine a 
diagnosis.18  
However, the PCL-R is also taken to measure inferred personality traits that 
do not coincide with antisocial behaviour. Moreover, there is evidence of a 
correlation between scoring highly on the PCL-R and specific behavioural 
responses in controlled conditions. These latter behaviours, that correlate higher 
with psychopaths than non psychopaths, are not part, at least evidently, of the 
behavioural symptoms registered by the PCL-R. Thus, as a first possible 
dimension of unity of the construct diagnosed with PCL-R, we can count certain 
specific behaviours in controlled conditions that are shared by those who score 
high in it. In addition, these behaviours are highly suggestive of cognitive and 
functional differences that might be taken to offer evidence of the unitary nature 
of the construct of psychopathy as individuated by PCL-R. Let us rehearse briefly 
these behaviours and inferred functional and cognitive differences. 
Functional impairments related both to emotional and cognitive spheres 
appear to be correlated with psychopathy as measured by PCL-R.19 Studies 
suggest that psychopaths manifest reduced levels of anxiety that are manifested 
by reduced physiological reactions to threatening stimuli, including imaginary 
situations. In addition, psychopaths show certain instrumental learning 
shortcoming in controlled. Finally, there are results, perhaps more controversial, 
concerning the reduced attention capacities of psychopaths.  
There are also studies that have focussed on the empathic reaction of 
psychopaths to distressed people. Psychopathy associates with reduced emotional 
responses, as measured by skin conductance, to the observation of the 
administration of punishments. Psychopathic offenders, when compared to non 
                                           
17 See, for example, Haksar 1965, Wootton 1959. 
18 See Blackburn 1988. 
19 For a recent survey, see Blair 2013. In addition these results are presented a discussed in the 
different chapters of Patrick 2006b. 
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psychopathic ones, manifest insensitivity to the distinction between moral and 
conventional transgression.20  
Although experts agree that we have not an ultimate account of the 
neurological causes of psychopathy, several researches have associated the specific 
functional profile of psychopaths with hypothesis concerning neurological 
correlates and causes. So, it has been argued that psychopathy correlates with 
dysfunction in frontal lobes and the prefrontal cortex in particular.21 Others argue 
that the hippocampus might have a primary role in psychopathy.22 Finally, James 
Blair and colleagues suggest that dysfunction of the amygdala are the key 
neurological causes of psychopathy besides impairments in orbitofrontal and 
ventrolateral cortex.23 Thus, we might derive some further evidence for the unity 
of psychopathy construct that is offered by PCL-R by the fact that it enables the 
formulation, within the available scientific knowledge, of hypothesis about specific 
neural correlates or event causes of the personality traits and behaviours it 
classifies. Similarly, this construct, is increasingly employed in research concerning 
the genetic basis of psychopathy.24 
The validity of a classification is related also to the predictive powers it 
confers. With the PCL-R based diagnosis of psychopathy, understandably, a 
primary focus has been on its capacity to predict criminal behaviour and 
recidivism. Supporters of PCL-R have offered evidence for the thesis that 
psychopaths are more likely to recidivate violent crimes.25 Even authors that 
criticise the claim that PLC-R is an “unsurpassed standard” in the prediction of 
criminal behaviour and recidivism, recognise its good predictive capacity.26     
To recapitulate, it seems that high scores in the PCL-R individuate a class of 
individuals that appear to be significantly more likely to reoffend than controls 
who share certain functional impairments that are not evidently associated with 
the behaviours that are involved in the diagnostic criteria. Moreover, there is 
enough evidence for advancing hypotheses about the possible underlying 
neurological correlates or causes of the disorder. Some use these features of the 
PCL-R to conclude that it individuates a unified construct.27 It seems more 
plausible to maintain that there is evidence for claiming that PCL-R is an 
“enough” unified construct, given some liberal requirements on the notion of unity 
                                           
20 Blair et al. 1995, however, see for contrasting results Aharoni, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kiehl 
2012. 
21See Raine 1993. 
22 See Raine and Yang 2006. 
23 See Blair, Mitchell, and Blair 2005. 
24 See Viding, Fontaine, and Larsson 2013, Waldman and Rhee 2013. 
25 See Hemphill and Robert D. Hare  2004, Leistico et al. 2008 and  Douglas, Vincent, and Edens 
2006. 
26 Gendreau, Goggin, and Smith 2002, but see also the response to this criticism in Hemphill and 
Robert D. Hare 2004. 
27 See, for instance, Nadelhoffer and Sinnott-Armstrong 2013. 
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at issue. However, the issue of the unity of psychopathy as diagnosed with PCL-R 
is open and hostage not only to further empirical research but also to philosophical 
insights concerning conceptual problems about the nature of the validity of 
psychiatric and scientific classifications in general. However, let us assume that, 
under a plausible account of validity, psychopathy as measured by PCL-R is a 
unified construct; does it follow that is a mental illness? 
 
3. The illness status of psychopathy: some harms  
 
It has been argued convincingly that one necessary condition for illness in general 
is involving harm or distress to the patient.28 Once this condition is endorsed, a lot 
remains to be spelled out. Clearly, it has to be specified what are the relevant 
harms. Usually, death, pain, shortening of life, limitations or absence of 
reproductive capacity, lack of social integration, lack of stable and harmonious 
relationships, capacity for work and so forth are mentioned in this respect. 
However, the list can be extended and things might be further complicated by 
adding, when it is applicable, “thresholds” of tolerance and duration to these 
harms. In addition, it has to be clarified in which way the condition at issue should 
relate the subject to these harms. It might be required that the condition actually 
causes the harm or just it predisposes the subject to it, perhaps with a given 
probability. It can then be debated whether the patients have to recognise some of 
these harms as such or their presence can be detected independently from the 
patients’ insight. Finally, there is the question of the justification and nature of 
the standards that should specify these harms. For instance, some concede that 
they can be socially sanctioned while others require that they have to be universal 
harms recognisable in any culture.  
Despite these difficulties it seems that, broadly speaking, psychopathic 
offenders are harmed by their condition.29 For instance, if we admit that the harm 
relevant to mental illness can be specified with reference to the values of our 
culture, they suffer harms. Their antisocial behaviours deprive them of socially 
valued things such as freedom that they lose due to incarceration, friends, and 
relationships. In addition, their different ways of reasoning and learning might 
explain their lack of academic and other achievements that are valued by society. 
Finally, psychopaths tend to die earlier than non psychopaths, even within the 
incarcerated population, due to correlations between psychopathy, violence, and 
various kinds of risky behaviour.30  
                                           
28 For a classical account of this type, see Glover 1970, chapter 6. 
29 See Nadelhoffer and Sinnott-Armstrong 2013. 
30 See Nadelhoffer and Sinnott-Armstrong 2013. 
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In any case, satisfying the harm condition cannot guarantee the illness status. 
Many clusters of behaviours, mental states and personality trait might be, for 
instance, conducive of the relevant harms listed above without being symptoms of 
an illness. It seems that illnesses should involve harms or distresses that result 
specifically from deviances of the body or the mind from certain standards of 
health or proper functioning.  
Several authors have thought that we should recur to the notion of biological 
function and dysfunction, understood in evolutionary terms, to offer, at least, a 
necessary grounding to the notion of mental illness to be integrated with the harm 
condition.31 Although these doctrines differ in details, especially in the way of 
articulating the notoriously difficult notion of biological function and thus 
dysfunction, they share an important assumption. According to these views, an 
account of mental illness should involve and objective grounding in value-free 
scientific notions such as, the supposedly so, concept of biological function. So, the 
harmful dysfunction analysis might be used to assess the illness status of 
psychopathy. 
Robert Hare, who has devoted his scientific career to refining PCL-R and 
defending the validity of the relative construct of psychopathy, is not inclined to 
regard psychopathy as a mental illness. Contemplating the evolutionary 
hypothesis that psychopathy might be an adaptive life strategy, but without 
discussing its merits, he claims that: 
... we should consider the possibility that the actions of psychopaths reflect 
cognitive, affective and behavioural processes and strategies that are different 
from those of other people, but for reason other than neuropathology or 
deficit, in the traditional medical and psychiatric sense of the term. (Hare 
2013: vii) 
The first premise of Hare’s reasoning is disputed. Some defend the hypothesis 
endorsed by Hare.32 Others, however, have argued that psychopathy is not 
adaptive.33 This is an extremely important debate that touches, amongst other 
things, upon the feasibility and specific formulation of evolutionary psychology 
and psychiatry. However, what about the second, implicit, premise in Hare’s 
reasoning? Does involving a biological dysfunction represent a necessary condition 
for mental illness? 
Bill Fulford, amongst others, has questioned the possibility to individuate 
value-free biological functions that could offer such an objective grounding of the 
notion of mental illness.34 Others have advanced more pragmatic considerations 
                                           
31 Amongst the most influential proposals, see Boorse 1975, and Wakefield 2007. 
32 See Mealey 1995 and Krupp et al. 2012. 
33 See Nadelhoffer and Sinnott-Armstrong 2013. 
34 See Fulford 1989. 
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against using biological dysfunctions to characterise mental illnesses. The debate 
on the adaptive nature of psychopathy illustrates the type of difficulties that can 
be found in establishing the evolutionary underpinnings of different mental 
disorders. Once we consider the practical nature of psychiatry, having to wait for 
the completed evolutionary account of our mind, would mean undermining much 
of current psychiatric practice. This clearly has very high practical costs that we 
might not be ready to pay.35 Finally, there are conceptual reasons for rejecting the 
idea that mental illness requires the notion of biological dysfunction. 
Rachel Cooper has argued convincingly that we can conceive plausible 
instances of biologically functionally or adaptive mechanisms that produce 
outcomes that we could still take to be disordered.36 For example and for the sake 
of argument, let us consider the hypothesis that agoraphobia is an adaptive trait 
for the kind of dangerous environments where human used to live.37 Despite we 
could regard agoraphobia as being biologically functional; we would still regard a 
person who has this type of phobia, in the type of society we are living in, as 
having an illness or disorder. So, keeping in place the harm condition, where should 
we look for to establish whether psychopathy is a mental illness? Bill Fulford has 
suggested that we have to focus directly on our everyday experience as agents to 
clarify the notion of disorder at the core of the concept of mental illness. Let us 
consider this account in the next section. 
 
4. Failures of ordinary doing and moral responsibility 
 
Bill Fulford has argued that debates concerning the notion of mental illness have 
been vitiated by the assumption that while mental illness and disease are value 
laden concepts, physical illnesses are objective features. Instead, he argues that 
both the notion of physical illness and that of mental illness are species of the 
value laden notion of illness. According to him, at the core of the notion of illness 
in general there is a failure of ordinary doing.38 Ordinary doings are intentional 
actions that we do, as opposed to things that happen to us. Specifically, Fulford 
considers the ordinary doings that do not involve any special attention or 
reflective assessment of the situation. He wants to call our attention onto what 
would be like to experience the inability to act in the ordinary way, without being 
capable to determine what is obstructing our action. Given that it is hugely 
important to us to act as we wish, this would be something that we would value as 
negative and dysfunctional, as something that ought not to happen given the 
                                           
35 See Bolton 2008, 160-61. 
36 See Cooper 2007, 33-34. 
37 This thesis is defended in Nesse 1987. 
38 See Fulford, Thorthon, and Graham 2006, 129 -134, and Fulford 1989. 
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usually relative effortless nature of this action. In addition, this phenomenon 
would be something that happens to the agent, as opposed something that she can 
do.  
According to Fulford, these basic considerations show that the primary 
experience of illness, as instantiated in the case of bodily movement, can be 
analyzed as a failure of “ordinary doing” in the perceived absence of 
understandable, from an ordinary perspective, obstructions or oppositions. In 
particular, this analysis of illness offers an insight in the specific values and harms 
that are involved in shaping the idea of illness as opposed, say, ethical or aesthetic 
values. In fact, intentional actions involve intentions that, in turn, involve positive 
evaluations and certain preferences. In addition, intentional acting is supported or 
constrained by expectations or norms about our capacities, about what we should 
be able to do effortlessly, about the kind of obstructions we might expect and so 
forth. Prevented actions associated with illness involve the existence of obstructing 
events that are not of the usual type. These action failures are thus experienced as 
(or even are) outside our control. 
Fulford also stresses that many illnesses are characterised by unwelcome 
sensations such as pain, nausea, etc.39 However, he thinks that also these features, 
that specify the character of the experience of illness, are based on failure of 
ordinary doing. People cannot act as they ordinarily do to avoid pains that require 
medical intervention. For example, we avoid a burning pain by moving away the 
hand from hot source. However, when the burning is due to a wound, we cannot 
perform this ordinary action to relieve the pain. Thus, in Fulford’s account, a 
mental illness is characterised by failures of ordinary action involving mental 
states and other processes that (i) directly interfere in unexpected ways with 
ordinary intentional action or (ii) that determine or include unwelcome or 
unpleasant sensations that cannot be avoided by performing normal ordinary 
actions. 
With reference to mental illness, Fulford’s account might appear primarily 
directed at characterising specific form of dysfunction and harm that can be 
appreciated as such by the person who undergoes the mental disorder. The person 
needs to have an experience of a failure of her ordinary acting that involves an 
awareness of the lack of her control. This specific lack of control would thus 
determine the kind of harm that, according to Fulford, is central in the experience 
and the notion of mental illness. Now, in order to establish the mental illness 
status of psychopathy, it might be surely worth investigating whether 
psychopaths experience their condition as involving, from their own perspective, 
failures of ordinary action. Their specific ways of reasoning and learning, their 
incapacity to have organised life plans, their impulsivity, and their emotional 
profile might strike them, from their own perspective, as problematic insofar they 
                                           
39 See Fulford 1989, 135-136. 
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involve failures of ordinary actions, as recommended by this reading of Fulford’s 
account. But this could be countered with evidence about the psychopaths’ lack of 
concern and insight about these shortcomings. It seems, in any case, that Fulford’s 
account allows a more liberal reading of the notion of failure of ordinary doing. 
This reading might offer us a deeper understanding of the kind of disorder and 
harm that might afflict the psychopath. 
The fact that many mental illnesses involve a lack of patient’s insight on her 
condition authorises the thought that Fulford’s account should accommodate 
ascriptions of failures of ordinary doing to subjects who are not in the position to 
appreciate them. In this case, some shared and sharable values and standards that 
shape an understanding of ordinary doing and its possibilities would frame third 
personal ascriptions of failures of ordinary doing. This means that the suggested 
notion of mental illness could also have a role in practices of social control that, 
anyway, are currently under the domain of psychiatry. So, it is very important to 
add that the adoption of a specific prescriptive and idealised model of ordinary 
agency, to frame then the notion of failure of ordinary doing, should be morally or 
even legally carefully justified. However, here the task at hand is not offering a 
prescription and justification of any specific idealisation. Instead, we have to 
clarify further the general form that such an idealisation should take.  
The requirements of moral accountability prescribe what should constitute the 
ordinary doings relevant to social interactions that are regulated by moral and 
other societal norms. In particular, such standards enable to classify actions along 
a broad spectrum from those which clearly are not caused by the will of the agent 
(involuntary actions) and those where there are weaker reasons for questioning the 
control that an agent has over that action (nonvoluntary actions).40 In all these 
cases, if an action or behaviour is judged to be nonvoluntary or involuntary, it 
means we have a reason for questioning whether the agent is fully morally 
responsible for that action or behaviour.  
I maintain that in addressing the illness status of psychopathy we should take 
into account standards that would be used to determine failures of ordinary doings 
that are significant for the moral responsibility of the agent. In fact, the principal 
harms that might afflict psychopaths derive from their morally or legally defective 
social interactions. If psychopathy is a unified construct and the harm brought 
upon psychopaths by their immoral and illegal behaviour derives from failures of 
ordinary doings that amount to a lack or a diminished moral responsibility, we 
should then confer to psychopathy an illness status. Therefore, an extension of 
Fulford’s account of mental illness shows that the philosophical investigation on 
the moral responsibility of psychopaths might be regarded, at the same time, as 
aimed at establishing the illness status of their condition. 
                                           
40 See Feinberg 1986, p. 104. 
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As I have pointed out above, the explicit introduction of idealised models of 
preferred styles of agency and moral responsibility to establish the presence of 
mental illness needs to be carefully justified. However, it is also important to 
recognise that ascribing mental illness to psychopathic offenders, because they 
depart from these standards, would imply that they lack or have diminished moral 
responsibility. This would recommend measures of treatment as opposed to more 
severe punishment. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I have maintained that a mental illness should involve a unified condition that 
produces harm to the patient in virtue of dysfunctions characterised by failures of 
ordinary doing. Although it is important to recognise that there are open 
theoretical and empirical issues, psychopathy as classified by PCL-R appear to be 
a unitary construct. In addition, it seems that psychopathic offenders, due to their 
condition, are also prone to suffer certain harm and distress. The issue whether 
psychopathy is a mental illness, however is left open given that I have not 
investigate whether these harms derive from failures of ordinary doing. Instead, I 
have suggested that this investigation should take into account the requirements 
for moral accountability that should frame our understanding of those ordinary 
doings that have a legal and moral valence.  
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